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THE USES OF JURISDICTIONAL REDUNDANCY:
INTEREST, IDEOLOGY, AND INNOVATION
Robert M. Cover*
The jurisdictional complexities of the American system of courts
have occupied generations of scholars, perplexed generations of
students, and enriched generations of lawyers.1 Consider the enormity of it all. There are more than fifty separate systems of state
courts, for most purposes largely independent of one another, but
coordinated m important respects by the full faith and credit
clause and by some dubious, specialized applications of due process. 2 Conflict of laws is a distinctive field of American jurisprudence-quite different from its private international law counterpart-because of those "loose" coordinating factors, enforced from
time to tne by the Supreme Court.8 Under the applicable juris* Professor of Law, Yale Law School. A.B., Princeton University- LL.B., Columbia
University.
I am thankful to the Marshall-Wythe School of Law and to the National Center for State
Courts for providing the stimulating forum at which this paper was presented. The paper
has benefitted greatly from the comments and criticisms of the other participants in the
symposium. I am also grateful to Bruce Ackerman, Ed Dauer, Jan Deutsch, Drew Days, Don
Elliott, John Ely, Joe Goldstein, Reimer Kraakman, Peter Schuck, and Aviam Soifer for
reading and commenting on earlier drafts of the paper.
1. Jurisdictional rules may be viewed, from one perspective, as limitations upon the authority of public actors. Like other procedural principles designed to impose regularity upon
public authority, jurisdictional rules may be manipulated to the strategic advantage of private parties and their lawyers. The more opaque the procedural principles are to discernible
ends, the more their mampulation becomes an arcane province of lawyers to be used in a
purely strategic manner. See Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: ProceduralJustice and
ProfessionalEthics, 1978 Wis. L. Rav. 30-64, 91-113. The objective of this Article, to discern a set of principles justifying jurisdictional redundancy, leads to decisional principles in
this area by which to judge the strategic demands of lawyers.
2. What is dubious about the application of due process is the use of the phrase to designate insufficient state authority to adjudicate quite apart from consideration of fairness to
the parties. See the dissent of Justice Brennan in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299-313 (1980).
3. There seems to be a cyclical character to the Supreme Court's concern for coordination
in conflicts. The last three years have witnessed an intensified concern with the imposition
of limits upon state court jurisdiction combined with an apparent continuation of the longstanding trend of imposing few constraints upon choice of law. Compare Rush v. Savchuk,
444 U.S. 320 (1980), World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), Kulko
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dictonal rules, many cases may be heard in the courts of more than
one state.
Superimposed upon this array of state institutions is the separate system of federal courts. Since 1789 the overwhelmingly consistent element in the relationship between these federal courts
and the state court systems has been concurrency or overlap of jurisdiction.4 The federal courts have never been primarily tribunals
vested with an exclusive special subject matter jurisdiction. 5
Rather they have been seized of classes of cases almost all of which
could have been heard in the courts of one or more states.6 While
both the state and federal courts are subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States on matters of
federal law, the independence of each of the state systems from
one another and of all from the federal system has remained real
and significant.7 The possibilities of concurrency are thus both
"vertical" (state-federal) and "horizontal" (state-state).
Two different emphases are possible in understanding this jurisdictional array The first treats the complex patterns of concurrency as both an accident of history and an unavoidable, perhaps
unfortunate incident of the formal logic of our system of states."
Political fragmentation and imperfect administrative integration of
the American nation in the late eighteenth century necessarily carried with it the malformed jurisdictional anomaly that we have endured, if not loved, for so long. The outline of our fractured jurisv. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978), and Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977),
with Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 49 U.S.L.W. 4071 (Jan. 13, 1981).
4. See H. FRENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 1-14. Compare H. HART &
H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FE ERAL SYSTEM 38-40 (1953), with ALI,
STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 99-104, 162-68,
366-69, 375-80 (1969).
5. The most important exception has been jurisdiction over federal crimes. Even that "exclusive" jurisdiction has become, in an important sense, concurrent in fact, if not in law. See
notes 73-89 & accompanying text tnfra for a discussion of the implications of the creation of
what are in effect concurrent crimes. Another apparent area of federal exclusivity, admiralty
and maritime cases, has been rendered for many practical purposes concurrent with state
jurisdiction by the "savings" clause. See H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 373-74.
6. See P BATOR, P MISHKIN, D. SHAPmO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 309-438 (2d ed. 1973).
7. The systems may vary from one another in terms of recruitment and selection of judicial personnel, in terms of court organization, and in terms of procedure and administration.
8. See H. FRENDLY, supra note 4, at 1-6.
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dictional mosaic, according to this view, was set in 1789 and, with
the inertia characteristic of all institutions, persisted long after any
functional basis had gone.9 The Constitution embodied the recognition in some measure of the formal sovereignty of states, with
the attendant formal independence of tribunals. Indeed, it may be
this independence as much as any other feature which makes our
states demonstrably not merely administrative units.10
But this emphasis upon etiology and formal sovereignty, however plausible as to origins, is weak in explaining the persistence of
these complex patterns of concurrency of jurisdiction. Despite a
civil war and a reconstruction which worked a partial revolution in
some features of nation-state relations, despite developments in
administration of welfare programs which, in fact, have made
states and their agencies mere administrative units of the national
government for many purposes,11 despite massive changes in the
substance and terms of federal court jurisdiction itself-the enlargement of federal question jurisdiction, the attack upon diversity,"2 which already have thoroughly reversed the pattern of
caseload in the federal courts as categorized by substantive
law' 3-despite all these changes, the structural pattern of redun-

9. See ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS

99-110 (1969), for an example of the expression of this view concerning general diversity
jurisdiction.
10. Cf. H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 11 (where the authors write of the
federal judicial power concerning "the general understanding [of the framers] that a government is not a government without courts").
11. Consider the detailed federal statutory and regulatory constraints on state administration in a typical federal/state program of "cooperative federalism." See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §
602 (1976); 45 C.F.R. §§ 200-282 (1980).
12. See the pending bill which would abolish diversity jurisdiction except for federal interpleader and would concomitantly remove the amount in controversy requirement for general federal question jurisdiction. H.R. 2404, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
13. In 1951, of private civil actions m the United States district courts (those in which
neither the United States nor a federal officer were parties), 6,062 were federal question
cases, 12,772 were diversity, and 2,591 were admiralty. H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note
4, at 52. In 1978, of private civil actions, 59,271 were federal question cases, and 31,625 were
diversity. Din. AD. OFF. U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 5 (1978). Of the 1951 federal question cases,

482 were habeas corpus for state prisoners, 122 were Civil Rights Act cases, and almost
3,000 were FELA and Jones Act cases (all personal injury cases of one sort or another). H.
HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 53. By 1978, that had changed: 16,969 were state
prisoner petitions, 1,494 were FELA cases, and 4,843 were marine tort actions. DiR. AD. OFF.
U.S. COURTS ANN. RaP. 60 (1978).
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dancy, of near total overlap in jurisdiction, has persisted.1 4 Many
of the formal attributes of the sovereignty of the states have bowed
before the onslaughts of necessity and convenience time and again
throughout our history while the crazy patchwork of jurisdiction, if
anything, has become more complex and apparently
anachronistic.1 5
An alternative emphasis is possible. Instead of viewing the persistence of concurrency as a dysfunctional relic, one may hypothesize that it is a product of an institutional evolution.1 6 The persistence of the anomaly over tine requires a search for a strong
functional explanation. With such an approach, one makes the
working assumption that the historical explanation of the origin of
the structure of complex concurrency of jurisdiction, even if accurate, does not suffice to explain its persistence. It is this approach
that I shall pursue here. But the objective of this paper will be a
limited one-the exploration of a hypothesis. I shall attempt to
identify the utility of the pattern or structure of jurisdiction that
we have had for 200 years-not the justification for some particular rule or institution, but the justification for the very pattern itself. For it is the structure of overlap that has been constant,
rather than the particular rules and areas of dispute. This argument will remain incomplete-a first step in a longer argument.
The identification of functions that complex concurrency of jurisdiction may plausibly be said to serve constitutes neither a full explanation nor a justification for the structure. It does seem reasonable, however, to suggest that both a fuller causal explanation and
an adequate justification of the structure must entail, at the least,
an understanding of the utility of the pattern. The objective of this
Article, then, is to take that first step. The Article will proceed to
outline the functions of complex concurrency, largely ignoring,
without thereby rejecting, the formal or historical arguments that

14. The increase in federal question jurisdictional redundancy has corresponded to the
growing importance of federal law.
15. See Developments In the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. Rav. 1133
(1977), for a good overview of the growing complexity of one important area of federal
jurisdiction.
16. I stress that the use of the "evolutionary" metaphor is only heuristic. I am by no
means suggesting that such a process of institutional evolution necessarily occurs; but, it is
permissible to set up such a conclusion as a hypothesis to be explored.
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might be said to explain or justify the system.
DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND NORM ARTICULATION

The jurisdictional pattern we are dealing with concerns jurisdiction to adjudicate. An understanding of the significance of the pattern therefore requires an understanding of the adjudicatory at.
Adjudication in the common law mold entails two simultaneously
performed functions: dispute resolution and norm articulation.
The work of comparativists and anthropologists should satisfy anyone that the intertwining of these two functions in the common
law fashion is neither a logically necessary nor an empirically universal condition.' 7 But there are deep cultural and contingent bases for the strong connection in American law. Moreover, these expectations are embodied in a series of formal norms with respect to
the conduct of adjudication that forbid outright, or discourage in
some contexts, the performance of one of these distinct functions
without the other. For example, the requirement of "case and controversy" in the federal courts is a formal embodiment of the requirement that the norm articulation function not be performed
apart from dispute resolution.' 8 The converse requirement may
also be found. It is true that there are many individual instances of
literally inarticulate dispute resolution by courts.' 9 Nevertheless,
both court rules governing adjudicatory procedure and, in some
cases, the Constitution's due process clauses require that dispute
resolution be accompanied by reasons. 20 This requirement of articulation, together with even a weak consistency requirement, over
time, will necessarily entail the articulation of general norms. As

17. For an interesting exploration of other ways in which dispute resolution and norm

articulation interact, see Eisenberg, Private OrderingThrough Negotiation:Dispute Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HAnv. L. REv. 637 (1976).
18. The reasons behind the requirement have been rehearsed by almost every commentator and critic of court and Constitution. I continue to find Bickel's discussion the best starting point. A. BIcKEL, THe LEAST DANGFRous BRANCH, THE SuPREmE COURT AT THE BAR oF
PoLIIcs 111-98 (1962) (chapter entitled "The Passive Virtues").
19. Consider the now frequent, but very questionable practice of many appellate courts in
rendering decisions without opinion. See, for example, Reynolds & Richman, The Non-Prec-

edential Precedent-Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States
Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. RPv. 1167, 1173 (1978), for a discussion of the federal
practice.

20. FED. R. Civ. P 52; FD. R. CRim. P 23(c); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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Cardozo wrote, "as a system of case law develops, the sordid controversies of litigants are the stuff out of which great and shining
truths will ultimately be shaped. The accidental and the transitory
will yield the essential and the permanent."21 It is important to
realize that these two functions are normally performed simultaneously in adjudication. Moreover, devotees of the common law often
attribute its genius to precisely this mix of dispute resolution and
norm articulation.
The dual function of adjudication has repercussions for our consideration of jurisdictional patterns. The advantages and disadvantages of complex concurrency in a jurisdictional structure will
often be differentially associated with the dispute resolution and
norm articulation functions. That is, some particular characteristic
of redundancy m the jurisdictional structure may be justified by
reference to an acknowledged purpose which is peculiar either to
dispute resolution or to norm articulation quite apart from the effect on the counterpart. For example, diversity jurisdiction is usually justified and explained as a device for avoiding partiality of
local tribunals to local litigants. Partiality may be viewed as primarily a problem in dispute resolution.22 The very significant area of
concurrency of jurisdiction thereby established is justified by reference to a dispute resolution end. However, a significant tension is
thereby set between the "normal" model of adjudication with intertwined dispute resolution and norm articulation and a concur21. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 35 (1921).
22. One trenchant restatement and critique of the traditional justification is to be found
in Wechsler, Federal Jurisdictionand the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 L. & CONTEMP.
PROB. 216, 234-40 (1948). See also Friendly, The HistoricBasis of Diversity Jurisdiction,41
HARv. L. REV. 483 (1928); Yntema & Jaffin, Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction, 79 U. PA. L. REv. 869 (1931); Frankfurter, A Note on Diversity Jurisdiction-InReply
to Professor Ynetma, 79 U. PA. L. REv. 1097 (1931). I confess that the battle of the late
1920's and early 1930's on this subject seems to remain more interesting than more recent
controversy. One participant is constant. See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 4, at 139-52. See also
Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1968).
Local prejudice may, of course, be demonstrated through norm articulation as well. Indeed, one might well conclude that the single most virulent form of prejudice against out of
staters in today's world of ordinary state court adjudication is the home-party-biased
choice-of-law methodology of "interest analysis." It is clear that one simple way to alleviate
that problem is to extend the scope of jurisdictional redundancy by overruling Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), which requires federal courts sitting in diversity
to apply the choice of law rules of the state in which they sit. See notes 114-115 & accompanying text infra.
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rent jurisdiction that is erected to solve a dispute resolution problem only. The question arises: will the concurrency of competence
with respect to dispute resolution carry with it concurrency of
competence in norm articulation as well? That question, of course,
constitutes the Erie problem.2 3 The fact that the Erie problem has
remained well-nigh intractable and capable of evoking heated
scholarly debate throughout our history 2 testifies to the difficulty
of separating the two dimensions of adjudication.
It has been no less problematic to construct complex structures
of concurrency primarily to resolve norm articulation problems and
then try to isolate that function from dispute resolution. For over
fifty years special three-judge federal district courts heard cases in
which the constitutionality of acts of Congress or of state legislation was called into question. These courts were set up because
alternative forums were considered insufficient for articulation of
norms of such consequence. However, the impulse to use three
judges instead of one, which arose out of norm articulation concerns, ran counter to standards of efficient dispute resolution. Because of the case and controversy requirement, a total formal separation of norm articulation from dispute resolution was impossible;
but complicated, unsatisfactory, and often inconclusive devices and
standards were developed to separate the constitutional norm articulation act to the extent possible-either by dismissing the constitutional claim as a preliminary matter, or by resolving the legal
claim and remanding most fact-finding to a single judge as a matter of remedy.25
It may also be maintained that all appellate review, including a
great deal of judicial review of administrative behavior, entails a
special purpose of articulating norms with attendant devices for

23. The relation between Erie and the fact of jurisdictional redundancy is well articulated
in Wechsler, supra note 22, at 240-42.
24. Compare Warren, New Light on the History of the FederalJudiciaryAct of 1789, 37
HARv. L. REv. 49 (1923), with Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REv. 693
(1974).
25. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90 (1974). The Act
of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, § 3, 90 Stat. 1119, eliminated the three-judge court as a
requirement in cases challenging the constitutionality of statutes, saving only the requirement that they be used in reapportionment cases. 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (1976). There are a
few other provisions that may require such a court. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(a), 1973c,
1973h(c) (1976).
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separating the articulation of the norm from the dispute resolution. Prospectivity in appellate review, because most explicit, is the
most controversial of a series of such devices.26
These examples suggest that the jurisdictional solution to a
monofunctional problem imposes a strain either upon the normal
forms of adjudication or upon the remaining function of adjudication. If we are to distill "great and shining truths" out of "sordid
controversies," it is surely a bit too much to expect that not only
the system of case law, but also the crazy-quilt of concurrency in
jurisdiction, will further this alchemy Time and again one component of the jurisdictional array has been manipulated either for the
purpose of resolving sordid controversies or for the purpose of polishing up shining truths with negative consequences in the other
areas.
COMPLEX CONCURRENCY

The jurisdictional array that I have identified as the traditional
and constant American structure of courts is a form of redundancy
that I shall call complex concurrency. This structure exemplifies at
least one of three important characteristics: strategic choice, synchronic redundancy, and diachronic or sequential redundancy The
first of these is nearly always present. The other two are manifestations of redundancy which are so costly that substantial and
often successful efforts are made to avoid their effects. As a result
they are frequently unrealized in the event.
Strategic choice is the pervasive attribute.27 In the jurisdictional
world of complex concurrency, it is usually possible for one of the
parties in a law suit to choose the most favorable from among two
or more forums in terms of expected return. And the United States
is uncommon in the degree to which it multiplies the potential for
forum shopping. The fifty-plus state jurisdictions reenact the international order in many respects, while the potential choice between a state and federal forum squares the difficulties or opportunities. Moreover, perhaps because the United States is not

26. See the discussion of prospectivity in A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA
55-58 (1978).
27. For a classic discussion of strategic behavior, see T. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY
CONFLICT (1960).

OF
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composed of truly independent sovereignties, jurisdictional lines
have not been of the bright-line variety.2 8 Both the states exercising jurisdiction vis-a-vis one another and federal courts deciding
upon the availability of the federal forum manipulate soft, imprecise standards subject to tremendous good faith, and bad faith,
variations in interpretation.2 9 The uncertainty of these standards
contributes to the likelihood that alternative forums will be invoked as part of a pattern of strategic behavior.
The strategic behavior entailed in forum shopping is only one
manifestation of complex concurrency. The structure of American
jurisdiction presents the possibility of more than forum shopping.
In some cases it is possible for more than one forum to be invoked
simultaneously. I shall call this phenomenon "synchronic redundancy." Synchronic redundancy again is not unknown in the law of
nations. But the American phenomenon is more widespread and
complex. The principle of full faith and credit requires that most
clear cases of synchronic redundancy ultimately abort. There may
be two or more proceedings initiated, with two or more discovery
stages, two or more trials, and more. But there will ordinarily be
only one effective judgment. General principles of res judicata read
into full faith and credit require this result. Other doctrines militate against synchronic redundancy by requiring deference on the
part of one forum once another forum has started to act. The
Younger doctrine, 0 the anti-injunction statute,"1 and the abstention doctrines2 are but a few instances of such rules and principles.
Nevertheless, there are a number of situations in which the principles of res judicata do not apply in an unproblematic way. For
example, the relation between two pending criminal prosecutions,
arising out of the same conduct but properly within the legislative
competence of two or more jurisdictions, will not be governed by
res judicata3 3 And the application of full faith and credit to ac-

28. See Field, The UncertainNature of Federal Jurisdiction,pp. 683-724 infra.
29. Id. at 723-24.
30. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103
(1977).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976).

32. See, e.g., Field, Abstention in ConstitutionalCases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. Rav. 1071 (1974).

33. See United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922); notes 73-91 & accompanying text
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tions for injunctive relief is by no means straightforward. 4 Nevertheless, it must be said that synchronic redundancy is very seldom
allowed to run its course, in the sense that multiple forums seized
simultaneously of a matter proceed to judgment without adjusting
for the judgments of the others.
A third pattern is somewhat more common than synchronic redundancy. The complex concurrency of the jurisdictional structure
frequently permits recourse to the courts of another system after
one system has adjudicated and reached a result. This diachronic
or sequential redundancy is comparatively common. Federal5
habeas corpus constitutes a large and important instance of it.3
But recourse to sister state courts in child custody and other domestic relations matters is also common.3 6 In general, wherever res
judicata is not absolute, so that sequential redundancy is a theoretical possibility m a unitary system, the concurrent complexity of
the American jurisdictional structure affords a greater opportunity
to realize the potential for relitigaton.3 7 Of course, not every dispute will lead a litigant to go to the lengths necessary to invoke a
concurrent forum. In the case of federal habeas corpus the cost is
small, given the plight of the petitioner.3 8 In a child custody case,
however, the price of the alternative forum may be an otherwise
unplanned change in residence or domicile. For better odds for a
child, some have paid the price. 9
Strategic behavior in the choice of a forum, synchronic redundancy, and diachronic redundancy-all are manifestations of the
complex concurrency of jurisdiction. It is time now to consider its
uses.
infra.
34. See, e.g., Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909); Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign
Equity Decrees, 42 IOWA L. REV. 183 (1957).
35. Compare Cover & Alemikoff, Dialectical Federalism:Habeas Corpus and the Court,
86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977), with Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus
for State Prisoners, 76 HARv. L. Rav. 441 (1963).
36. See, e.g., Ferreira v. Ferreira, 9 Cal. 3d 824, 512 P.2d 304, 109 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1973).
37. The fact that relitigation is formally possible in a unitary system does not mean that
it will likely produce a different result. A losing party, therefore, will often eschew relitigation. The alternative forum may afford a reason to believe that relitigation will be profitable
to one side or the other.
38. See Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38
U. Cia. L. REV. 142 (1970).
39. Ferreira v. Ferreira, 9 Cal. 3d 824, 512 P.2d 304, 109 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1973).
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REDUNDANCY

The three possibilities discussed above emerge from the structural characteristic of forum or jurisdictional redundancy. This
characteristic of redundancy in the design of other sorts of systems
is now well understood to be essential to secure reliability. Everyone understands that if you wish to make sure that a physical
structure is strong enough at certain points you put extra material
or extra strong material at the given point. Or you may duplicate
the critical beam or arch, using two components where one might
do. Fairly early in the development of cybernetics as a separate
discipline, it was also demonstrated that redundancy could provide
a solution in principle to the problem of unreliability of components in information systems.40 Since that time, sophisticated refinements in specification of necessary redundancy characteristics
in information systems have been made. 41 Still more recently, political theorists have borrowed from cyberneticists and have argued
that redundancy in a political decision system may have some of
the same positive characteristics as it has in inanimate decision
systems. 2 Of course, m a real sense, the work of classical liberal
political theory had already made many of these points, albeit
without the technical jargon.43
In this section I shall review some specific arguments for the
utility of redundancy in human decision systems in four important,
related areas. I shall denominate these areas as Error, Interest,
Ideology, and Innovation. Of these, the latter three will be shown
to constitute justifications for the jurisdictional redundancy which
characterizes our federalism.

40. The classic paper, I am told, is von Neuman, ProbabilisticLogics and the Synthesis
of Reliable Organismsfrom Unreliable Components, in AUTOMATA STUDIES 43-98 (C. Shan-

non & J. McCarthy eds. 1956). I confess that I understand only the general outline of the
paper.
41. J. SINGH, GREAT IDEAS IN INFORMATIONAL THEORY LANGUAGE AND CYBERNETICS (1966),
is a readable introduction.
42. J. STEINBRUNER, THE CYBERNETIC THEORY OF DECISION (1974); Landau, Redundancy,
Rationality and the Problem of Duplication and Overlap, 29 PUB. AD. REv. 346 (1969);
Shapiro, Toward A Theory of Stare Decsts, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 125 (1972).
43. Landau makes this point mcely in Landau, supra note 42, at 351.
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Error
The theoretical treatments of redundancy in artificial intelligence and in communication theory undertake to use this characteristic of a system to deal with "error." Error in a computer can
be easily defined. It means that a gate is open when it should be
shut or shut when it should be open. If all operations consist of
combinations of binary positions, there is, in theory, a mechanically derivable correct position to all gates. The reliability of a component can be defined as its probability of being in the correct position. By appropriate levels of redundancy in the right places, it is
possible to use a series of components, each of which is insufficiently reliable, and to construct with them a system with a much
higher reliability coefficient.44 With enough redundancy you can
make that coefficient theoretically as high as you might wish.
A somewhat more mundane application of redundancy to deal
with error m communication might elucidate its uses. Suppose one
were confronted with the need to receive a very important message
over a communication medium with a high level of static interference. It is essential that the message be received with a virtual certainty of accurate reception. One might imagine a company of
three on the receiving end of the message making several possible
arrangements. Suppose only one person can listen and there can be
but one reception. Presumably the "best" listener will listen, and
the group will ponder the lacunae or uncertain segments after the
reception to figure out a plausible message. If there can be but one
transmission, but no limit on listeners, the team will be better off
with redundant receptions. All three will listen and transcribe independently. Several things might happen. Certain message components will be "confirmed." By this I mean that all three listeners, independently of one another, will receive the same message
parts. It will be well to treat such message components as "correct." The reason is simple. Assume the probability of A having
correctly received a message that he thinks he heard correctly to
be .9. Assume the same for B and for C. The probability of error
for any single one is .1. It can then be shown that if A, B, and C all
44. Singh's explanation of this principle is more accessible to the general reader than is
von Neumann's proof. See J. SINGH, supra note 41, at 39-58.
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believe that they correctly heard a component and independently
agree upon it the probability of error is .0014,45 a major increase in
reliability.
Confirmation of the clearer parts of the message is only one
small part of the benefit of the "redundant receiver" strategy. Suppose certain components are received by one but not the others of
the listeners. It may be that the received component elicits subsequent acquiescence of the others. They may agree, "Yes, now that
you say it that did sound like ' 'orse' with a cockney accent." Such
confirmation is "weak confirmation." The subsequent acquiescence
of the others is not independent of the reception being confirmed
so that one cannot use the law of joint probabilities of mutually
independent events. Nevertheless, the confirmation is worth something. The weakly confirmed message is certainly no less certain
than the unconfirmed component received by only one listener.
The three listeners may do more than confirm or weakly confirm
one another. Suppose each receiver receives one or more components wholly unconfirmed by the others. These components, individually no more reliable than the single receiver case, may gain
confirmation from context. But the potential for contextual confirmation increases with the amount of material for context that is
provided. Whereas a single receiver might not provide sufficient
context to confirm component Xn, the joint product of three receivers may provide Xm and Xo to flank Xn. Each of these three
unconfirmed components may confirm each other indirectly by
providing the context for one another within a larger message. Indeed, it is conceivable in an extreme case to find these unconfirmed components to be the links which indisputably make sense
of the whole message.
Note that it is the redundancy of three independent centers of
reception that make possible all of these advances over the single
receiver situation. Consider now the situation of redundant trans-

45. This is the probability of error given the fact that all three agree. The prior
probability of all three agreeing and being in error is .1 x .1 x .1 = .001. The prior
probability of all three agreeing is .9 x .9 x .9 + .001 = .730. Given the fact that all three
agree, the probability that all three are m error rather than all three being correct is .001 .730 = .00137. P(U) is the probability of unanimity and P(E) is the probability of error. We
wish to calculate P(E/U) or the conditional probability of E given U. The formula P(E/U)
= P(E + U) - P(U) = .001 - .73 = .00137. For a more general formula, see note 51 infra.
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mission as well as reception. It is clear that static interference randomly distributed over a message may sufficiently blot out the
message so that no amount of receptor redundancy will help. But
repeated transmissions will, by the same law of joint probabilities
of independent events, be quite likely to yield acceptable levels of
clarity of more components than would a single transmission.
There will again be confirmations, weak confirmations, and indirect confirmations of different components. e
Receptor redundancy and transmission redundancy still leave
out one component in our highly simplified story That component
may be called "deliberative redundancy." If the message as a whole
remains unclear even after confirmed components are put together
with all the components received by even one of the listeners, then
a problem of deduction remains. This problem will have cryptographic elements to it. It is the hypothesis of at least some decision
theorists that small groups are better at resolving such tasks than
is a single individual. 1 It is not clear that one would or should
refer to the decision process characteristics of such a small group
of people working together as entailing redundancy But in some
ways the term is not wholly inapposite. The problem-solving capacity of each of the individuals in the group is a dimension quite
apart from the "reception" of information. That problem-solving
capacity is backed up by the not identical and partly independent
problem-solving capacity of the other actors. Moreover, almost all
problems require the solver to bring information or experience to
bear which is not communciated as part of the problem itself. The
group of problem-solvers will bring, collectively, large amounts of
information and experience to bear that a single individual would
not. 48 There are, of course, limits to the size of a group that can

46. "Redundancy may be said to be due to an additional set of rules, whereby it becomes
increasingly difficult to make an undetectable mistake." C. CHERRY, ON HUMAN COMMUNICATrIONS: A REviEw, A SURVEY AND A CRIrIcISM 185 (1957), quoted in Shapiro, Toward a Theory
of Stare Decists, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 125, 129 (1972).

47. See Lempert, Uncovering "Nondiscernible"Differences: Empirical Research and the
Jury-Size Cases, 73 MICH. L. REv. 643 (1975). Contrast I. JANis, VICTIMS OF

GROUPTHINK:

A

(1972).
48. This is to say, of course, that the additional decisionmakers are not really redundant.
A more precise use of terms here might require that we state that multiple decisionmakers
introduce a situation in which there is a high level of redundancy. The decisionmakers do
replicate one another to a substantial extent, but the nonredundant information and abiliPSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF FOREIGN-POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES
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effectively communicate. In any event, short of exceeding such size
limits, the group of problem-solvers constitutes a redundant array
of solution potentials which may lead to quicker or better results.
Up to this point I have been speaking of the solution to a problem that has, in principle, a correct answer-the accurate reception
of a message. The utility of redundancy lies arguably in the reduction of the probability of errors or of certain kinds of error. The
applications of this use to our problems of adjudicatory jurisdication are by no means straightforward. And yet, a most obvious,
simplistic application must be made-subject to elaboration and
revision in the sections which will follow.
It is an important element in the liberal theory of adjudication
that decisions are rendered on the basis of correct determinations
of fact. While everyone understands that the degree of certainty of
correctness may vary greatly-with complex legal rules and institutions designed to attribute consequences to varying degrees of certainty in different kinds of cases-it is nonetheless supposed to be
an approximation to a truth, in principle discoverable.49 (Even the
umpire who says, "They ain't nothm' till I call 'em," does not
thereby claim that his calls are independent of the physical course
of the ball.) It is therefore in order to ask whether redundancy in
the design of the adjudicatory system furthers the desired end of
reducing "error" defined simplistically as deviation of outcomes
from those that would be predicated upon an accurate and truthful
account of the event.
The answer to this question is an unqualified "yes." There are
many redundancy features in procedure most of which are not jurisdictional. Trial testimony and exhibits go over the same ground
covered by depositions, interrogatories, and document discovery.
Multiple witnesses routinely testify to the same events. A given
witness is asked essentially the same question in different ways by
different lawyers. There are twelve or fewer jurors to hear, see,
evaluate, and decide the same case on the same evidence. There is
a judge who, along with the jurors, hears, sees, evaluates, and decides the case and possibly intervenes in the juror's decision. All of
these devices may be said to entail a measure of redundancy for

ties justify the practice.
49. See H. HART, PUNISHMENT

AND RESPONSIBILITY

(1968).
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the purpose of correction of error or identification of areas of
doubt and uncertainty. If several witnesses confirm one another's
stories, we treat the confirmatin as significant. If they contradict
one another, we do not, as system builders, regret that we permitted the redundancy element-multiple witness-that led to the
contradiction. Rather, we pride ourselves that a problematic area
of doubt has been identified.5 0 Similarly, if trial testimony and discovery material are confirmatory, no problem arises. If a comparison reveals contradictions, we permit the deposition or mterrogatory to be used for impeachment. Thus, we identify a potential
uncertaintythrough redundancy. Likewise, cross-examination may
reveal that we are less certain about something than we would
have been had we relied upon direct examination alone.
Examples could easily be multiplied. The point is clear. Redundancy is in fact a critical strategy in procedural systems for purposes of confirming the "correct" and establishing the areas of uncertainty, that is, the areas of more probable "error" in any
element of the proceeding. But, these uses of redundancy are not
ordinarily jurisdictional. That is they do not entail the use of multiple potential or actual forums for disputes. It is, of course, possible to use multiple forums to deal with the potential of mere error, 51 and we do so occasionally in providing for a de novo review.
50. A principle function of syntactic redundancy is the identification of problematic parts
of a message. Often, only higher levels of redundancy will identify the correct message. See
J.

SINGH,

supra note 41, at 39-58; Shapiro, Toward A Theory of Stare Deczsts, 1 J.

LEGAL

STUD. 125, 125-28 (1972).

51. Professor Bator in his classic article on habeas corpus seems to deny both of the
premises of this section: that proceedings are based in any straightforward sense on correct
determinations of fact; and, assuming they are so based, that redundancy produces significant gains in reliability. Bator, supra note 35, at 446-49. On the latter issue Bator seems to
be wrong. If we have n independent iterations of an event with a probability of error P(E)
for each event, then the probability of all iterations producing erroneous results is P(E)n
(We will assume that P(E) is less than .5, otherwise there can be no acceptable level of
certainty with one trial or with 1000.) The probability of all iterations producing correct

results is [1 - P(E)]n Obviously, the probability of agreement of all iterations, P(A), is the
sum of these two probabilities. P(A) = P(E)n + [1 - P(E)]n The probability of divergent
results is 1 - P(A). The probability of any given array of divergent results, where exactly m
outcomes are in error and n - m results are correct, is determined by expanding the bmomial. P(E)m, the probability of error in m of the n trials, is

m! (n-n)!

P(E)m

[l - P(E)]n-m

The probability of exactly m of n trials being correct is, of course, simply the probability of
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But, it is very expensive and the coordination principles necessary
n-m being in error.
P(E)n-m

=

n!
m! (n-n-)!

P(E)n-

[1

-

The prior probability that outcomes will split so that there is a distribution in which exactly
m outcomes diverge from the other n-m is the sum of those two probabilities. The
probability of a distribution of m outcomes of one sort and n-m of the other, P(Dm
n-m), is P(E)m + P(E)n- m . This result is intuitive for the distribution occurs both when
n outcomes are in error and n-m are correct and when n-m are in error and rn are
correct.
Once n trials have occurred and we know the distribution (Din n-m) which resulted, we
will wish to know what the probability is that the m trials are in error as opposed to the
n-n. The contingent probability that m trus are in error, given the distribution (Dm,
n-m) is computed as follows. P(E.m/Dm n-m), the contingent probability of error in m
cases given the distribution (Din, n-n) is
- m
m
P(E) [I - P(E)]n
P(Em)
P(EM)
m
n- m
m
+ P(E)n- m 1I - P(E)]
P(E) [I - P(E)]
P(Dm, n-m)
P(Em) + P(En-m)
In the special case where m
formula yields the result
=

P(EnfDno)

=

n, that is where the results are in agreement in all trials the

P(E)n

P(E)n
[1 -P(E)

The general formula yields other interesting patterns. In the special case where m = n/2,
the probability of error in exactly m cases, given the distribution (Din in), becomes 1.
Therefore, the outcome is not helpful in determining which of the results to adhere to. In all
other cases, however, the formula yields a P(Em/Dm, n-m) which is at least as informative
as a single trial. Where rn = n - rn + 1, P(Emn/D , rn-,) = P(E). In general, where n
m + (m - q) the formula simplifies so that
+ (
=
P(Em/Dm, m -q)
P(E)' -+ [1 - P(E)]q
It will be recognized that this is the formula for the contingent probability of error in q
trials, given the agreement of all q outcomes. The implications for Bator's rejection of redundancy are clear. Any odd numbers of trials will always yield as great or greater certainty
than a single trial. A measurable increase m certainty over the outcome of a single trial is
achieved whenever the number of trials with one outcome exceeds the number of trials with
the opposite outcome by more than one. Even a spread of one achieves the same degree of
certainty as a single trial.
If one takes a number such as .1 for P(E) and 3 for n, this means that the prior
probability of unanimity is .73, The probability of error given agreement is .0014. The
probability of a 2-1 split is .27. And, given a 2-1 split, the probability of the two results in
agreement being in error rather than the one being in error is .1. Thus, in 73% of the cases
we are better off than with a single trial. In the other 27% we are no worse off. Note that in
terms of the structure of a procedural system we can achieve the higher level of certainty of
n=3 by routinely giving two trials of an event and providing a third only when the first two
diverge, since in all cases in which the first two trials agree the third trial would only either
confirm the first two or yield a 2-1 split with the first two trials providing the rule of decision. Such a structure is reminiscent of the structure imposed by federal habeas although
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to deal with inconsistent outcomes may become cumbersome.
Within a single forum and proceeding, the contradictions among
witnesses or between different statements of a single witness may
be evaluated in a single act of judgment which encompasses a view
of all the contradictory material. The output of a system of redundant forums, however, is either confirmatory or contradictory verdicts. Presented with such verdicts, one cannot easily pass judgment on questions of error in reconstructing events without first
unpacking what might be called forum effects. The redundant forum causes us to focus on forum variables just as redundant testimony causes us to focus on testimony variables.
A commonplace observation supports this point. Ad hoc "jurisdictional" redundancy is commonly demanded when questions of
factual error assume massive political significance. I have in mind
special commissions or boards which might advise political leaders
concerning the use of pardon or related powers in special political
cases. The Sacco-Vanzetti case 2 called forth such a solution, as did
the limited character of the federal court's jurisdiction and the limited scope of redundancy
in fact-finding makes the analogy only suggestive.
If one assumes a fairly high P(E) such as .2 a redundant regime of n=3 provides truly
dramatic improvement. In 52% of the cases'all three outcomes will agree. In those cases the
probability that all three are m error will be .011. Thus m slightly over half of the cases we
move from 20% chance of error down to a 1% chance of error. In the other 48% of the cases
the outcomes will split 2-1. By deciding in accord with the two we run a 20% risk of being in
error. Note, however, that if that risk is too high we may add contingent layers of redundancy thereby reducing the risk still further. An additional two trials in all such (2-1) cases
would yield 4-1 splits after the five trials in 52% of these cases. As to these cases we would
achieve the 1% error rate. As to the 48% of the original 48% (23% of the original population) there would remain a .2 probability of error. One could, in theory, continue to iterate
in the problematic population until the number of such cases approached zero.
Of course, since we are not dealing with mere mechanical iterations with a constant P(E)
but with strategic interactions by "players" who learn from experience, the model cannot be
useful without including the game theoretic implications of redundancy. Such a model is
beyond the scope of this footnote. Professor Bator's rejection of redundancy, however, seems
to be based on the simple notion that repetition achieves nothing. Given the demonstrable
gains from repetition in the simplified case, the burden would appear to be on one who
would deny its utility to show that the strategic interactions destroy any such gains.
Of course, nothing in this footnote provides an answer to the question of whether the
gains from redundancy are worth its costs. On that issue, compare Cover & Alemikoff, Dialectical Federalism:Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977), with Bator,
Finality in CriminalLaw and FederalHabeas Corpus for State Prisoners,76 HAav. L. Rv.
441 (1963).
52. Governor Fuller appointed a commission headed by Abbot Lawrence Lowell, President of Harvard, to investigate the case. The Lowell Committee found no unfairness. See G.
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the Dreyfus case. 53 The phenomenon attests to the naturalness of
the impulse to invoke another forum when there is grave factual
doubt based on political mistrust of the forum. The question that
the rest of this paper addresses is whether this simple observation
can be generalized to support current and long-standing practice.
The potential for simple error, then, justifies a measure of redundancy in the structure of procedural systems. But the coordination devices necessary for jurisdictional redundancy are awkward, and the bluntness of jurisdiction as a tool does not permit
the redundancy to be focused upon particularly suspect issues and
facts. But this does not mean that more systemic sources of divergence of outcomes are not best dealt with through jurisdictional
solutions. The cleavage between jurisdictional systems of courts
corresponds to more general political lines within our nation. The
uses of jurisdictional redundancy, therefore, might best be sought
by examining the kinds of problems associated with systematic political authority. There are three such areas that I have singled out
for discussion here: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation. These
terms are a shorthand for three general problems: (a) the self-interest of incumbent elites in a regime; (b) the more or less unconsciously held values and ways of seeing the world, reflected in the
governing elites, which tend to serve and justify in general and
longrun terms the social order which the elites dominate; and (c)
the consciously determined policies of the authoritative elites, especially insofar as they depart from traditional, common cultural
norms and expectations.
The proposition that I begin with is that different polities with
differing constituencies, peopled by distinct governing elites, indeed will differ from one another in some measure with respect to
all three areas. Clearly, the self-interest of the incumbents of one
system is not necessarily furthered by the possibly corrupt pursuit
of self-interest by the incumbents of another polity. Whether there
are salient ideological differences among governing elites in polities
within a larger national and cultural entity is a more difficult quesJOUGHLIN & E. MORGAN, THE LEGACY OF SACCO AND VANzsrrx, 298-309 (1948) (Chapter XI,
"The Governor and His Committee").
53. After Dreyfus' conviction of treason in 1894, a period of five years of intense political
struggle led to a second trial in 1899. A third proceeding occurred in 1906, which finally
exonerated Dreyfus. See D. JOHNSON, FRANCE AND THE DR~wus AFFAm (1967).
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tion. It may well be argued that, on the whole, the United States
has become sufficiently integrated economically and culturally so
that distinct ways of understanding the world no longer tend to
characterize our geographic regions nor to characterize the elites
responsible to national as opposed to local constituencies. Mind
you, I am here commenting on ideology rather than interest and
policy. The different constituencies of different states and regions
may well give rise to elites with differing interests and different
policy objectives. But, so the argument might run, the pursuit of
locally, regionally, or nationally oriented policy objectives all may
proceed from a common epistemology, a common, if implicit, political economy, and a common ethic. I am inclined to believe that
the very long-range trends are distinctly in the direction of rendering geography a less salient corollary of ideological differences. But
I am also inclined to believe that this is a matter of degree and
that there remain important ideological correlates to the political
lines within America." I am not prepared to prove or disprove this
hypothesis, and the argument within proceeds upon the assumption that some such salient differences do remain.
The political subdivisions of America do indeed present a range
of policy initiatives differing both in terms of conditions to be met
and ways of meeting them. While it would be absurd to suggest
that policy differentiation does not now occur among the several
states and between the national and state levels of government, it
is by no means absurd to suggest that the most significant policy
questions are increasingly a function of a single, national-level decision and implementation process. If this is true and remains true,
it does not destroy the argument that follows but reduces the significance of the conclusions that flow from it.
Each of these three areas must now be addressed separately and
in detail. We proceed first to a discussion of "interest."
Interest
Let us take a most obvious case first-a case so obvious that the
point seems to have been missed by ten federal judges-a district
54. I am, of course, counting regional variations as correlating with the political divisions
of America because it can be captured by groups of states, even though the differences
among states within each group are ideologically insignificant.
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judge and the nine Supreme Court Justices-who recently considered the matter. Suppose all the judges in a particular judicial system have a personal, financial interest in the subject matter of a
law suit. Such would be the case if, for instance, the manner in
which the judges are paid or the salary scale applicable to the system as a whole were in dispute.55 The old maxim that no man shall
be a judge in his own cause-reinforced by the Code of Judicial
Conduct and in the federal system by the disqualification provisions of the judicial code5 6 -requires that such a case, if possible,
not be heard by the interested judges. If the case involves state
court judges, the natural solution to the dilemma of self-interest is
to hear the matter in the federal courts. Often, this may be possible. If the objection to a state judicial compensation scheme is that
it fosters or constitutes partiality and unfairness, the objection
may be cast m due process terms and heard by federal courts as an
issue of federal constitutional law.57 Conversely, any objections to a
federal judicial compensation scheme may, in principle, be heard
in state court in the first instance. For state courts are charged
with the application of federal law and, as the Supreme Court
never tires of informing us, are the tribunals of residual general
jurisdiction in our system both for state and federal law.55
In fact, while federal courts have been used as forums for deciding cases in which state judges are interested parties, the absence
of the converse is striking. In United States v. Will,59 several fed55. United States v. Will, 49 U.S.L.W. 4045 (Dec. 15, 1980) (holding that the timing of
revocation of raises that would have accrued under the Executive Salary Cost-of-Living Adjustment Act violated the compensation clause of article III). See also Evans v. Gore, 253
U.S. 245 (1920).

56. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1976).
57. See, e.g., Tuney v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).

58. It is difficult to know what to make of the fact that no one seems to have suggested
that a case like United States v. Will, 49 U.S.L.W. 4045 (Dec. 15, 1980), be decided in state
court. Of course, the plaintiffs chose the federal forum, and, as a suit against the United
States, there was a jurisdictional basis. The question is what kind of interaction there ought
to be between jurisdiction and the so-called "Rule of Necessity." The court treats jurisdiction as a lexically prior step to its consideration of the Rule of Necessity. Assuming federal
subject matter competence, there is no basis for recusal since all federal judges are equally
interested. But the problem of direct and substantial self-interest might be understood,
given the potential state forum, as a jurisdiction-blockmg issue just as the deference implicit

in the abstention doctrine blocks jurisdiction. Indeed, the Court might have conceived a
special abstention doctrine for such cases.
59. Id.
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eral judges sued, clauming, on a variety of theories, that the denial
of raises to them over a period of years violated the compensation
clause of article III. All of the federal judges who heard the case
thought the Rule of Necessity permitted federal judges to sit and
decide the case despite an interest inseparable from that of the
plaintiffs.6 0 The United States as defendant did not contest this
application of the Rule of Necessity
These somewhat extreme instances of system-wide self-interest
would not, in themselves, go very far to justify an ongoing structure of redundancy. In such bald form they are too obvious and too
Infrequent. The Supreme Court had to wait sixty years between
Evans v. Gore6 1 and Unted States v. Will.6 2 If we define "interest" in the narrow sense of a direct monetary stake in the outcome
of litigation, it will be rare indeed for the whole system of judges to
be "interested." However, there are less obvious and more insidious kinds of self-interest that are likely to infect a judicial system.
The most common and disturbing phenomenon is the reality or
suspicion of too strong linkage between the judiciary and political
power. Reliable judges are terribly useful to political machines.
They may be called upon to certify election results, to take appropriately lenient action when insiders are caught en flagrante, or to
take appropriately stringent action when enemies of the machine
must be punished. In short, their task is to clothe power in the
cloak of law and favoritism in the garb of justice. The "interest"
implicated in such regimes is simple enough. Judges who are chosen for their strong links to the regime in power may be expected
to identify regime interest with their own self-interest. A carrot or
a stick, or both, insure a generally adequate level of reliability on
the part of such judges. It may be necessary at times to rely upon
the less tangible and often less certain bonds of ideological identification, and many cases are intermediate areas between the judge
who is a virtual hired hand of a machine and one who simply

60. See td. at 4049. See also Will v. United States, 478 F Supp. 621 (N.D. IlM. 1979) (issue

not addressed by trial court).
61. 253 U.S. 245 (1920).
62. 49 U.S.L.W. 4045 (Dec. 15, 1980). There were sequellae to Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245

(1920). See Miles v. Graham, 268 U.S. 501 (1925), and O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277
(1939), both of which involved only individual judges rather than the full bench. See also
O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933).
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shares a world-view with the dominant elite in the machine. Acknowledging that a continuum of positions exists between those
two points, we shall treat one end of the continuum-that associated with direct, often corrupt, forms of self-interest-as the separable problem of "interest," while the other end of the contimuum
will be discussed in the next section as the problem of "ideology."
The kind of self-interest represented by the judicial compensation cases is so stark that it identifies itself. Even if the judges
presume to decide the dispute despite their self-interest, they must
discuss the issue and be accountable for their having decided it.
The illegitimate self-interest of the machine judge does not proclaim itself though it may be notorious. Even if notorious, it may
be unprovable. Moreover, it is often, though by no means always,
difficult to know to which cases the interest extends. All of the
above considerations militate against the use of conventional, ad
hoc disqualification devices for the corrupt judge.
Jurisdictional redundancy is a structural solution that will frequently give relief.63 It is the suspicion of corruption, so often unprovable, that leads a litigant to invoke a parallel forum. Even if
one of the litigants expects to benefit from corruption and opts for
the corrupt forum, the potential of a system of concurrency for
synchronic redundancy inhibits the operation of corruption. The
development of data to prove or reinforce the suspicion of corrupt
complicity will be greatly aided by an independent forum, even if
its outcomes must compete with those of the corrupt forum for ultimate implementation. To put it bluntly, if I am someone about.to
get railioaded by a corrupt system, I greatly value the opportunity
to invoke a fair forum even if the corrupt forum's verdict does not
bear its corruption on its sleeve and, thus, will compete with that
63. Madison supported an independent system of inferior federal tribunals in part on the
ground that it is a structural solution to interested state courts. A federal appellate presence
would not suffice.
"[Ulniess inferor federal tribunals were dispersed throughout the Republic
with final jurisdiction in many cases, appeals would be multiplied to a most
oppressive degree." Besides, "an appeal would not in many cases be a remedy."
"What was to be done after improper Verdicts in State tribunals obtained
under the biased directions of a dependent Judge, or the local prejudices of an
undirected jury9 "
H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 17 (quoting 1 M. FARRANn, THE REcoRDs

FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 124-25 (1937)).
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of the fair forum for recognition. The concurrent forum does not
provide a solution for the corrupt interest of judges, then, but
rather a weapon with which to fight it. And this may be suggested
as a general point about the utility of concurrency as a strategy.
This structure is not m general useful for the imposition of determinate solutions. Rather, it facilitates conflicting answers and thus
necessarily increases the area of indeterminacy It is an approach
to dilemmas of suspicion and uncertainty, not a forumla for clearcut answers.
Ideology
I have stated that the liberal conception of justice depends upon
the idea that in principlethere are relevant facts to be found. The
success of such a system based upon the determination of facts
depends upon the degree and scope of trust in the society The
philosopher, Michael Polanyi, has written:
The widely extended network of mutual trust, on which the factual consensus of a free society depends, is fragile. Any conflict
which sharply divides people will tend to destroy their mutual
trust and make universal agreement on facts bearing on the
conflict difficult to achieve. In France the Third Republic was
shaken to its foundations by a question of fact: the question
whether Captain Dreyfus had written the 'bordereau.' In Britain
the dispute over the genuineness of the 'Zinoviev Letter,' as in
the United States the trial of Alger Hiss, aroused popular conflicts which made it impossible to agree universally on the facts
of these matters."
Polanyi points to a disturbing, recurring phenomenon in liberal adjudicatory systems. But it may be argued that he somewhat understates the depth of the problem. For it is surely not the specific
conflict, the facts of which are to be adjudicated, that is itself responsible for the chasms of mistrust that make it difficult or impossible for normal adjudicatory institutions to be trusted to reach
reliable findings. Rather, certain specific conflicts are understood
to lie upon a perceptual or conceptual fault line determined by the

64. M. POLANY1, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: TowARDS A POST-CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 241 (1958)

(emphasi added).
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different and conflicting ideologies of the relevant social groups.

Robert K. Merton summarizes the essence of this ideological perspective on thought:
The sociology of knowledge takes on pertinence under a definite
6omplex of social and cultural conditions. With increasing social
conflict, differences in the values, attitudes and modes of
thought of groups develop to the point where the orientation
which these groups previously had in common is overshadowed
by incompatible differences. Not only do there develop universes
of discourse, but the existence of any one universe challenges
the validity and legitimacy of the others. The co-existence of
these conflicting perspectives and interpretations within the
same society
leads to an active and reciprocal distrust between
65
groups.

Thus, it is the existence of social groups in conflict which is the
precondition for the development of conflicting "universes of discourse," while those conflicting universes of discourse serve to aggravate and create distrust. Put somewhat differently, for each
group its "ideology" serves as a "template" to organize experience."6 But the fact that different groups use different templates in
organizing experience cannot but lead to distrust and conflict. For
ultimately, the most profound determinants of our thought are
those of which we are least conscious. And if even these dimensions of our epistemology are socially determined and only relative,
we shall be beset by gravest anxiety and anger when we unwittingly come across a different and distinct epistemology. As Lippmann put it almost sixty years ago:
Without the habit [of treating our own experience as necessarily
filtered through our "stereotypes,"] we believe in the absolutism
of our own vision, and consequently m the treacherous character
of all opposition. For while men are willing to admit that there
are two sides to a "question," they do not believe that there are
two sides to what they regard as a "fact. '
And so we finally come back to adjudication. In a society such as
65. R.

MERTON, SociA

THEORY AND SociAL STRmumE

218 (1949).

66. See C. GERT, Ideology As a CulturalSystem, m THE
193-229 (1973).
67. W. LippmN, PUBIC OPInoN 82 (1922).
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ours, in which the social bases for diversity in total world-views is
surely present, and in which there is persistent mistrust-though it
fluctuates in intensity-adjudication can always become a ritualized enactment of the epistemological chasms between one class
and another, one race and another, one gender and the other; between different generations, different nations; and between city
and country, town and gown. 8
When we challenge a verdict on ideological grounds-that is, on
the ground that the decisionmaker's construction of reality was
distorted by the social determinants of his mental world-we make
what is both far more and much less than a claim of error. On the
one hand we may (but need not) concede that the decisionmaker
acted correctly within his or her frame of reference. Given his or
her perceptual and conceptual apparatus, it was the "correct" decision. Presumably, if such is conceded, we may expect a likeequipped decisionmaker to reach the same result. The confirmation of an outcome by iteration of trials within a suspect apparatus
only confirms the suspicion. So in one sense there is no claim of
error at all. However, the very structure of the mind of the decisionmaker is challenged once one argues that it is a socially contingent apparatus and that it is functionally related to the needs and
experiences of the group characterized by that structure."9 For, if
the dispute in question can be fairly understood as intergroup in
some sense, then the question that begs for an answer is why does
the ideology of this group, rather than that of its antagonist, determine the outcome.
Most of the forms of redundancy within a unitary system do not
solve the dilemma of an ideological challenge. There is one marked
exception. The overlapping domains of judge and jury speak to the
issue. This overlap is unique in this respect and deserves to be

68. For an example of one commentator who would drive the logic of these chasms to
their conclusion, see Note, The Case for Black Juries, 79 YALE L.J. 531 (1970).
69. The distrust and suspicion which men everywhere evidence towards their adversaries
may be-regarded as the immediate precursor of the notion of
ideology.
[But we] began to treat our adversary's views as ideologies only
when we no longer consider them as calculated lies and when we sense in his
total behaviour an unreliability which we regard as a function of the social
situation in which he finds himself.
K.

MANNHEIM,

IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA

61 (Wirth and Shils trans. 1936).
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treated with jurisdictional redundancy in any comprehensive functional account.7 0 On the other hand, redundancy across jurisdictional lines is admirably suited to speak to many of the dilemmas
of ideological challenges. As our political lines continue to correspond less and less to differences in social systems and culture, this
clain may become less valid, but it remains true today to an important degree.
Thus, to the extent that the jurisdictional alternatives differ
with respect to the supposed salient social determinants of ideology, complex concurrency constitutes a strategy for coping with
ideological impasse. If outcomes are confirmed by the courts of two
or more different systems which vary with respect to supposed social determinants of knowledge and mind, this result would suggest
some common epistemological ground with respect to the issue
presented and with respect to its resolution. For a series of jurisdictional alternatives to present a plausible network of redundancy
sufficient to "correct" ideological bias requires that those alternative forums arise out of widely varied political bases with attendant variations in the constituencies to which they speak. In terms
of the American judicial systems, an approximation to this variation obtains in several ways. Most state court trial judges are
drawn from local, provincial elites, while federal district court
judges are more likely to be drawn from a national elite. Levels of
education, bonds of loyalty, status, and even economic class may
differ radically from one group to the other. Members of the national elite corps share a common education, a cosmopolitan reference group. Members of the state bench share provincial concerns,
a local reference group, and ol' boy politics.
All judges, of course, can be presumed to be members of a professional elite. As such, regardless of jurisdictional redundancy, we
could hardly expect too great a diversity of class identity-at least
so long as one takes such gross factors as occupation and income as
prime, if not sole, determinants of class. But neither class homogeneity in such terms nor the somewhat milder race or gender homogeneities found among judges is conclusive of the matter. Both in
terms of their need for comprehensive ideological positions and in
terms of their need for practical political allies, political elites can
70. See R.

MERTON,

supra note 65, at 218.
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differ radically from one another.
Indeed, the differences between primary identification with local
as opposed to national elites is a major theme in the literature of
modernization.7 1 In the United States, no less than in more recently developing countries, continental integration is a matter of
degree. The degree of identification of an officialdom with national
rather than local groups may often correlate with its attitudes on a
series of critical social, economic, and political questions. Indeed,
in the United States virtually all major ideological clashes of the
past century have had strong geopolitical correlates. Often they
have pitted local against national ideologies; frequently, they have
presented urban-rural conflicts or have set one region against another. We need not answer the question of why this is so. Some
would undoubtedly argue that it is because geopolitical identification itself correlates with a more fundamental variable-that is,
degree of economic development with attendant class structure.
But whatever the reason, if it is the case that ideological conflicts
correlate with geography, then redundancy structured along such
lines will be a relevant mechanism for addressing many ideologytype claims. To put it more concretely, a system of complex concurrency between a state court in Mississippi and a federal court in
New York 2 may not thereby capture in either forum the class consciousness of the proletariat or peasant. But insofar as the primary
local elites of Mississippi grow out of and speak to the experiences
of a social structure radically different from that in which a New
York federal judge is located, they will bring to bear conceptual
and perceptual equipment which does differ with respect to matters that are salient to industrial worker and poor farmer. While
neither court may be made up of anything but politically well-connected elite lawyers, these elites may be faithful to and responsible
for different social orders. If one views judges primarily as enforcers of and apologists for a social order, then the responsibility for
different orders and different dimensions of order will determine
different mind sets. Put more generally, it is both position in a
71. See, e.g., C. GERTz, The Integrative Revolution: PrimordialSentiments and Civil
Politics in the New States, in THE INTMRMRATION OF CuLTuREs 255-310 (1973).
72. The issue is not purely hypothetical. Consider the problem of libel through the national media.
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social order and the nature of the social order itself which determines ideology. Even if judges in all systems have in common a
somewhat privileged position in their respective social orders, they
do not, in a nation as diverse as ours, necessarily share the same
social order.
This paper does not attempt to establish the empirical data to
support the proposition that American jurisdictional lines do correlate positively with diverse social orders. I should like rather to
assume at least a weak case for that fact and proceed to consider
its implications. The assumptions will be (1) that there are differences between state and federal judges in terms of relevant background, responsibilities, and reference groups sufficient to determine different ideologies, and (2) that there are differences among
states or groups of states sufficient to determine different ideologies. For now, we need not take a position as to why those differences exist.
I have mentioned that the adjudicatory process entails both dispute resolution and norm articulation elements. Ideological distrust entails related challenges to both dimensions of adjudication.
It implies skepticism about the reliability of a range of adjudicatory acts and orientations: ethical and practical judgment, capacity
for critical or empathetic orientation to parties and witnesses, and
appreciation for consequences. Thus, in its most blatant form, a
system may be challenged because its judges cannot be expected to
understand-to empathize with-"our" kind of people. They will
literally not comprehend "us" without an act of translation, will
not believe even when they understand what is foreign to them in
the experience of "our" people, and will not appreciate the consequences to "us" of "their" standards.
Confusion and misunderstanding is most acute where there is an
apparent convergence of discourse, when words and terms are the
same or similar but meaning is different. However, when there is
clear disagreement about relevant norms, expressed as such, it is
possible to grapple with the differences directly. Thus, in the realm
of dispute resolution, in precisely those cases in which relevant
norms, as articulated, appear not to be subject to controversy, ideological differences may work their most insidious harm. For it is
here that authority is seen not only as in conflict but as untrustworthy. Moreover, clear divergences in the articulation of norms,
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whether or not the result of divergent ideologies, are readily susceptible to hierarchical solutions if a solution be desired. But the
work of ideology in dispute resolution admits of no such easy hierarchical solution. If the problem is to be addressed at all, it must
be addressed through one or another redundancy device. These
points are best developed by an example.
a.

Multiple ProsecutionsBased on Mistrust of Forum

The general principle forbidding double jeopardy is held not to
apply in instances where the same conduct constitutes a violation
of state and federal criminal law. 3 Since the 1910's there has been
a steady progression of crimmalization on the federal level so that
a very large number of crimes under state law constitute federal
crimes as well.7 4 Some of these statutes make the very same conduct criminal under federal law whenever the conduct has an interstate element to it.7 5 Other federal statutes use a more indirect
approach by taxing certain transactions which are criminal in most
states. 6 The reporting and disclosure necessary to comply with the
tax laws on the federal level entail high risk of prosecution on the
state level. Therefore, these tax laws have the intended effect of a
predictable pattern of noncompliance by those engaged in state
criminal conduct. That pattern of noncompliance thus brings a
federal enforcement and adjudication apparatus into service. Redundant federal criminalization is also very widespread where
there is broad federal regulatory oversight, as in securities and
banking, 7" or where there are federal instrumentalities, as in bankIng 8 or mail-related crimes.7 9 Prostitution," auto theft,8 1 bootleg73. E.g., Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) (federal prosecution following state
prosecution); Bartkua v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) (state prosecution following federal
prosecution).
74. See Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutors'Discretion, 13 L. &
COmNTMP. PROB. 64 (1948).
75. See, e.g., The Interstate Racketeering Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(2) (1976) (making a
federal crime out of interstate travel or use of the mails to further any unlawful activity).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Kahrger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953) (gambling); United States v.
Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42 (1950) (marijuana).
77. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
78. See, e.g., Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101 (1943); 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1976).
79. 18 U.S.C. § 2114 (1976) (interference with the mail); 18 U.S.C. § 2115 (1976) (post

offices).
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ging, 2 kidnapping, 3 riot," narcotics, 5 embezzlement, 6 bank robbery, 7 and mail frauds"8 are all necessarily or potentially federal as
well as state crimes. In many instances the decision to develop or
invoke the redundant criminal law forum is related to a mistrust of
the alternative, a mistrust frequently arising out of considerations
of interest or ideology.
For example, 18 U.S.C. § 241 makes criminal any conspiracy to
"injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having
so exercised the same;" 18 U.S.C. § 242 similarly makes criminal
any such deprivations "under color of any law." These statutes
have been repeatedly used to remedy perceived deficiencies in local
and state law enforcement and adjudication whether rooted in the
.racist or other suspect ideological characteristics of the locality, or
in the entrenched powerful positions of the wrong-doers.
Justice Roberts wrote in Screws v. United States: "The only issue is whether Georgia alone has the power and duty to punish, or
whether this patently local crime can be made the basis of a federal prosecution."8 9 The answer to Roberts' question, that "local"
crimes such as murder can be made the basis of federal prosecutions, has become more and more evident over the ensuing thirtyfive years. And the clarity of the answer is related to clarification
of the uses of redundancy to check distortions in the primary criminal justice system. In Screws itself, the Justice Department
sounded what has become a general theme. The United States argued that the allegation of involvement of local officials in wrongdoing is itself a reason for invoking an independent system to

80. See Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913).
81. See 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1976). But see United States v. Crawford, 466 F.2d 1155 (10th
Cir. 1972).
82. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1265 (federal regulation of liquor traffic). See also Seaboard Air
Lme Ry. v. North Carolina, 245 U.S. 298 (1917).
83. See Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925).
84. See 18 U.S.C. § 2101 (1976).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42 (1950).
86. See 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1976).
87. See note 78 supra.
88. See 18 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976).
89. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 139 (1945) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
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guard the guardians. This use of redundancy to check the self-interest of law enforcement officials in failing to prosecute their own
wrongful acts is by now almost uncontroversial, although there are
those who prefer that the redundancy be incorporated as an epicycle within the unitary legal system.
b. Multiple Prosecutions Based on Ideological Differences
A somewhat more controversial practice has also developed:
bringing federal prosecutions based upon ideological, rather than
self-interested, mistrust of the state forum or of its prosecutorial
apparatus. It is now common to ask, for example, after a controversial acquittal m a state trial prosecuting the issue of racism,
whether a federal civil rights prosecution will be brought. The uses
of sections 241 and 242 for thirty years have been most prominent
in the civil rights arena; the crisis of ideology created by the civil
rights movement is hardly unique. Indeed, the modern statement
of the rule that such sequential intersystemic prosecutions do not
constitute double jeopardy derives from the felt ideological necessities of a somewhat different era. The gulf that separated wet
from dry during the heyday of the politics of prohibition entailed a
complex of attitudinal differences encompassing much more than
booze. In some parts of the country local fervor for prohibition enforcement greatly exceeded that of the federal government; m
other states and localities, however, that federal enforcement
which did exist was met with considered campaigns of nullification.
Everywhere allegations of blatant corruption were common. The
solution ratified by United States v. Lanza" permitted separate
state and federal prosecutions arising out of the same conduct,
thus recognizing that the mistrust engendered by a too lax regime
of enforcement might be mitigated by an adjudication in the more
"reliable" forum. 1
The relation of federal and state prosecutions in such instances
of mistrust based on ideology and/or interest is by no means simple. It may be that the two jurisdictions will confirm one another.
For example, an alleged bootlegger might be acquitted by the
90. 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
91. See Schwartz, supra note 74, at 71.
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courts of New York, ideologically suspect to the dry's, 92 or an al-

leged Klan killer of blacks might be acquitted by a state court in
Mississippi. If a subsequent federal prosecution in such cases confirms the acquittals, it may remove some measure of the mistrust
created by and directed at the local verdict. The capacity of the
federal court decision to serve this function depends in part on its
independence from factors making the state court a target of suspicion. Are the federal judges less tied to local elites? Are the federal juries drawn from a different pool without the characteristics
of the state jury pool? The alleviation of suspicion may be accomplished even if there is only a partial mitigation of ideologically
biasing factors.
Reiterated acquittals mitigate suspicion on one side while reiterated convictions may serve to alleviate it on the other. The defendant is being shown, after all, that even the jurisdiction with leanings most in tune with the ideological claims of the accused
perceives the defendant as the perpetrator of conduct not to be
tolerated. Thus, for example, federal prosecutions directed at civil
rights activists or southern state prosecutions directed at local
white violence might have moral effects that the more predictable
pattern of prosecution by the more hostile jurisdiction would not
have.
The opportunities for mitigating distrust by confirmation of outcomes and of their implicit messages that are a product of complex
concurrency is, however, only half the story (perhaps less than
half), for the several systems seized of a matter may fail to confirm
one another. Indeed, if we are to suppose that the common perceptions of lay observers, litigants, and lawyers alike have any basis in
fact, the more different the public perception of various tribunals-that is, the more they are perceived to speak from different
social bases-the more likely they are, in fact, to differ in adjudicating cases. Is there any value to the display of nonconfirming resuits in different tribunals?
If there is a chasm rendering the social reality of one group in
our nation problematic to another, and if that problem of perception and apprehension is to arise in the work of adjudication, there
92. For a view of the federal role during prohibition which confirms that which I state
here, see M. Wn

nRAmr,
THE INSm

oF PsoHmmoN (1929).
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is much to be said for making it explicit. Systematic differences in
perception and apprehension by various court systems is not to be
expected as a result of deviance and marginality alone. In some
respects the ideological gulf separating the truly dispossessed of
the society from its governing elites is not going to be bridged or
displayed in the variations among state and federal tribunals. For
despite recurring complaints about judicial salaries, no system has
yet turned its bench over to its luftmenschen and beggars. But the
political bases of the elites in different polities do vary remarkably
and have varied historically still more. Filtered through the elites,
we may thus perceive a modified and rationalized version-a
tamed variation-of the naked interests of constituent groups.
In short, when we see the alternative forums reaching nonconfirming, inconsistent results, we are watching the impasse between
the toned-down versions of social reality and right conduct held by
at least locally significant groups in the society Of course, there
must be ways of dealing with an impasse. A defendant either will
or will not go to jail. But it may be very significant to be apprised
of the fact that this defendant goes to jail in consequence of an
impasse rule or goes free because of one, while another conviction
or acquittal has been confirmed without inconsistent results in two
or more tribunals. Such knowledge might well affect prudential decisions relating to the party, such as sentencing or pardoning, or
might affect political decisions with respect to future enforcement
policy or subsequent norm articulation. In effect, the disagreement
of outcomes in redundant proceedings is a signal and an important
one.
Innovatin
One of the most familiar metaphors in federalism is that of the
social "laboratory." Both Brandeis and Holmes used the image
often. As Holmes wrote in Truax v. Corngan, "There is nothing I
more deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth Amendment beyond the absolute compulsion of its words to prevent the making
of social experiments that an important part of the community
desires, in the insulated chambers afforded by the several states
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....
,13 This simple figure of speech can be fleshed out into an
argument that innovation in norm articulation is healthier in a
federal system. Such an argument requires only that there be a
sizable number of polities, a sufficiently similar set of experiences
within each, and effective communication among the political entities. If these three conditions are met, one may postulate that
certain distinct advantages in terms of norm articulation will
accrue.
If there were a unitary source for norm articulation over a given
domain, the costs of error or lack of wisdom in any norm articulation would be suffered throughout the domain. Now consider the
actual state of affairs in the United States. There may be with respect to many matters a potential for a unitary national norm.
Congress or the Supreme Court could, perhaps, announce a uniform and exclusively federal rule-constitutional, common law, or
statutory. However, more typically we rely upon a regime of
polycentric norm articulation in which state organs and lower federal courts enjoy a great deal of legislative autonomy. This multiplicity of norm articulation sources provides opportunities for
norm application over a limited domain without risking" losses
throughout the nation. This proliferation of norm-generating centers also makes it more likely that at least one such center will
attempt any given, plausible innovation. For, although one cannot
know this with certainty without understanding the politics of
each separate entity, it is likely, as a practical matter, that the
many centers will include among themselves norm articulators
both more and less risk averse than would be a single national
source.9 5 With adequate communication, successful experience
93. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921) (Holmes, J. dissenting).
94. Consider the analogous argument of Martin Shapiro that the 52 jurisdictions constitute m some sense a single decentralized decision system for torts. Shapiro, Decentralized

Dectston-Making In the Law of Torts, M POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING 44-75 (S. Ulmer ed.
1970).
95. Assume a very simplistic politics. Decisionmakers m each polity reflect risk averseness
in their decisions according to the results of a poll of their constituents. A linear and continuous scale relating decisions to constituent responses to the poll exists. In the national polity the constituent response is simply the sum of all subentity constituent polls. Thus, it is
clear that either the national constituent preference is identical with all subentity constituent preferences or there are some subentity preference patterns reflecting greater and lesser
risk averseness. If decision patterns follow constituent preferences, -the decisions will also
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with an innovation will persuade others, slightly more risk averse,
to follow suit. Thus, if one assumes a distribution of risk averseness among the "local" legislators, state and federal, which brackets the risk averseness of the sources for national norms, the result
will be an important qualification upon the inertial quality of the
polity as a whole. The multiplicity of centers means an innovation
is more likely to be tried and correspondingly less likely to be
wholly embraced. The two effects dampen both momentum and inertia. Assuming a general readiness to take risks, the array of multiple norm articulation sources, some of which will not go so far in
innovation, will then mitigate the damages suffered through risky
experiments. All of these are familiar concepts. It justifies, at least
in some areas, the existence of a system of polycentric norm articulation. Such a system is a prerequisite for, but does not itself justify, jurisdictional redundancy.
It is possible to specify more exactly the ways in which polycentric norm articulation operates, especially in a world in which the
various jurisdictions are not chambers wholly insulated from one
another. Such a specification will suggest some of the uses of jurisdictional redundancy as well.
a.

Confirmatory Redundancy

If the several legislative authorities"8 articulate the same norm,
the norm is, if anything, clarified and intensified. One of the characteristics of those prohibitory regulations often labeled malum in
have this characteristic. However, as I have indicated in the text, the politics of the various
polities may differ. Thus, it may be the case that in the national polity, decisionmakers will
be, on some issue, less closely linked to constituent preferences than would be local decisionmakers. This might be the case on a relatively low visibility item if lobbyists and special
interests have concentrated on national decisionmakers. The "special interests" might be
risk prefering on some issue. Because they are active only on the national level, they may
influence decisions so that the national norm shows less risk averseness than any of the
subentities. Even though the constituency at the national level is simply a sum of the subentities, national politics bear no such simple relation to state politics. Thus, one cannot say
for certain that the elimination of local polities would leave a national polity more moderate
than the extant extremes of the fifty-odd jurisdictions we know. The analysis in the text
assumes, nonetheless, that an exclusively national rule would be more moderate. This is an
assumption of the conventional wisdom even if it is not true. Pursuing the assumption at
least demonstrates the logic of the conventional model of federalism.
96. I use the term "legislative" here to mean all norm articulation work including that of
legislatures and courts.
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se is the fact that a wide variety of norm articulating sources, independent of one another, reinforces the prohibition. There are several ways in which the iteration of a norm operates to reinforce it.
It first removes what might be called jurisdictional doubt. If the
norm is found almost everywhere, then it is a safer inference that
the norm will be applied even when it is unclear what norm articulation source operates over a given domain. Second, the fact that a
variety of norm articulators have independently arrived at a given
conclusion about some conduct reduces the likelihood that the conclusion is a product of local error or prejudice, ideology, or interest.
If a large number of jurisdictions arrive independently at the conclusion that a certain kind of conduct is wrong or detrimental, then
the conclusion is more apt to reflect the problematic character of
the conduct than the problematic character of the norm articulation process. 9 7 Finally, the meaning of the norm will be clarified by
reiterating independently the "central core" conduct, which all jurisdictions include within the prohibition, while leaving less clear
signals for the penumbral areas with respect to which controversy
exists. It will be clearer that there is in fact an unproblematic core
area of conduct to which the norm will be applied. The redundancy that establishes clarity through iteration, however, need not
be cross-systemic. A unitary system may, over time, clarify by repetition as well. Density of contemporaneous utterances of equal authority then is simply a horizontal array performing a function
similar to that of a body of precedent over time. Insofar as the
array occurs over similar domains, the contemporaneous array has
greater force as (redundant) repetition of a principle.
b. Nonconfirmatory Redundancy
If we turn from the very "simple" case of redundant articulation
of a norm as confirmatory to the more complex instances of conflict or confusion among the sources of articylation, a very different
image emerges. Nonconfirmatory articulation of norms by different
polities may reflect, of course, different social conditions and/or
ideologies. The prior sections have dealt with that result. However,
there may be a more prosaic explanation. As law changes, it may
97. It is not important here to decide whether such a widespread norm reflects human
nature or a broad cultural adaptation to a common environmental factor.

676

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:639

change in different ways and at a different pace in different jurisdictions. The social laboratory metaphor does not tell us how the
results of "experiments" in one lab come to claim the attention
and deliberative energies of another.
Up to this point in the analysis, the distinctive and arguably advantageous characteristics of polycentric norm articulation have
not required jurisdictional redundancy Once we focus upon the
overlapping effects of legislation outside the limited domains of individual states and districts, however, jurisdictional redundancy
becomes central. If fifty-odd primary legislative authorities and
several hundred coordinate judicial authorities are to pronounce
upon the effects and limits of conduct which is entitled to and regularly does cross those political/jurisdictional lines, then there are
two important advantages that flow from jurisdictional redundancy First, the ensuing jurisdictional conflict may play a special
role in communication among polities. Second, jurisdictional choice
affords a kind of fairness to people whose affairs are caught in the
vice of change-whose private lives and expectations are shaken by
innovation.
(1)

Communication.

The advantages of polycentric norm articulation are greatest for
little things.98 Decision theorists have contrasted two paradigms
for decisionmaking.
One, variously denominated "synoptic" '9 and
"analytic,"1 0 0 posits a comprehensive choice between two alternative end-states with a complete cost-benefit analysis or similar
mode of choice employed. Such a comprehensive comparison
among options places an enormous burden on the decisionmaker.
It may place impossible demands for information, analytic power,
and attention upon the decision process.101 Great decisions may

98. See Shapiro, Stability and Change in JudicialDecision-Making: Incrementalism or
Stare Dectsis?, 2 L. TRANSrriON Q. 134 (1965).
99. D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, A STRATEGY OF DECISION; POLICY EVALUATION AS A
SOCIAL PROCESS (1963).
100. J. STEINBRUNER, supra note 42, at 25-46.
101. See id. See also R. CYERT & J. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM (1963); J.
MARCH & H. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS (1958). Both of these classic works in organization theory build from the point that limited decisional capacity requires modifications in the paradigm of comprehensive optimization decisions.
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possibly require that such demands be met. The demands will be
met, if possible, if the matter is so important that few other decisions can compete for these resources. But more routine decisions
cannot totally usurp the attention of the authoritative decisionmaker or the informational and analytic resources available.
Systems must be structured to cope with such decisions more routinely. Different analysts have concentrated upon somewhat different dimensions of such routinized decisionmaking, labelling it alternatively "disjointed incrementalism' 1

02

or the "cybernetic

paradigm."103

In such systems the component act of decision focuses on a relatively small number of marginal changes in critical
variables and responds to these with a repertoire of "programmed"
responses. The insufficiency of such a set of responses to complex
problems in a complex environment is obvious. But "under conditions of complexity, decisionmaking organizations arise which attempt to match the complexity of their environment by means of
an internal complexity which is not the property of a single decision maker, but rather of the collective." 10
' The polycentric norm
articulation of our court system is one such instance.
Today, courts may or may not be said to operate with a limited
number of programmed responses to a few critical variables.0 8 Unlike the kinds of organizations studied by Cyert and March,106 by
Stembruner, 0 7 or by Simon, 10 8 they are typically uncontrolled by a
top-level "management" which can integrate the decisions,
whether analytically or by "sequential attention to goals."109 The
system, if it is to be successful, must have nonhierarchical solutions to the problem of integration of decisions, solutions which are
102. D. BRAYBRooKE & C. LNDBLOM, supra note 99.
103. J. STEmNBRuNER, supra note 42, at 47-87.

104. Id. at 69.
105. It might be argued that in a traditional system built on stare decisis each decision
departs only marginally from preset responses, and then only in response to a very few
salient variables m the situation. Whether that description ever fits appellate courts in the
United States I do not know, but it seems far from an apt description of many appellate
courts today.
106. See R. CERT & J. MARcH, supra note 101.
107. See J. STEINBRUNER, supra note 42.

108. See J. MARcH & H. SIMoN, supra note 101.
109. The term is that of R. CYET & J. MARCH, supra note 101.
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themselves adequately complex. 110
A large number of decision centers, simultaneously dealing with
the same or similar problems, generates a density of experience
that produces information quickly with simultaneous, interactive
effects of decision and environment. At this point jurisdictional redundancy comes into play. The availability of alternative forums
makes information, at least about pairs of jurisdictions, a matter of
practical relevance to lawyers and litigants. Forum shoppers and
those who oppose them thus become the carriers that polinate one
system of courts with the information about another system's experience.""" Moreover, where synchronic or diachronic redundancy
is possible, each system must confront the potentially conflicting
outcome in the same case of some other court with its alternative
norms. Such a possibility makes second thoughts and adjustments
more likely. Finally, such conflict of laws cases present a dramatic
enactment of paired alternatives for future norm articulation. No
longer is the court presented with an abstract choice of which rule
to choose. Rather it is presented with at least two parties, each of
whom claims as his own one of the alternative norm formulations.
In short, acquiring information about other jurisdictions and their
rules is a tine consuming and costly process. It is in those cases in
which a party claims another forum and/or its rule that a given
court is forced to focus upon the other courts that compose this
11 2
internally complex response to a complex environment.

110. See Shapiro, supra note 94.
111. For a number of reasons this effect should be more pronounced in a system with
jurisdictional redundancy than m one of a multiplicity of wholly independent decision centers. While in both cases adversaries nght raise the law and experience of another jurisdiction, it is far more likely when those data have been part of the earlier strategic choices
concerning the forum. Moreover, the vertical redundancy of the federal courts permits the
neutral perspective on alternative norms.
112. There is another way of looking at tins. Courts are much more likely to seriously
encounter another court's law m an explicit choice of law situation. While such choice of law
cases can arise whether or not there is jurisdictional redundancy, there is a strong positive
correlation between the availability of multiple forums and the appearance of choice of law
questions. The reason is simple enough. Many cases can appear to be domestic-the interstate element largely ignored-if it is natural and inevitable that they be heard only m the
courts of the state with a particular relation to the subject. Once that jurisdiction link is
established, several other relations become more salient and choice of law becomes
problematic.
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Fairness.

Innovating jurisdictions hiive a simple interest in externalizing
the costs of the transition to whatever extent possible. While there
are constitutional limits to what a state can do in externalizing
such costs, those limits are very far from a comprehensive and effective bar."'
Moreover, it is by no means clear in many cases which of several
different norms is the "innovation," and it is rarely if ever plain
who ought to bear the costs of a transition. In short, a right answer
to the question of how much of the cost can be imposed upon
whom may be impossible to conceive. Nonetheless, there may be
plain enough questions to be asked and some likelihood that different courts will answer them differently, not because of ideology or
interest but because of differing views and commitments with respect to the policy issues at stake.
Jurisdictional redundancy can alleviate such problems in one of
two ways. Most simply it may-as in the case of ideology-simply
facilitate fighting fire with fire. A party, prejudiced by the policy
commitments of Forum One will have an opportunity to try to invoke Forum Two with its contrary policy whether as an alternative
to, a replacement or supplement for, or a sequel to Forum One.
Alternatively, the concurrent jurisdiction may afford a neutral
choice of law forum, a sort of Archimedean fulcrum above the commitments of either of two forums. The disinterested forum for
choice of law might have developed out of diversity were it not for
the Klaxon rule. 1 4 Moreover, the case could be made that, today,
choice of law is one of the primary areas where some respectable
state courts do systematically prejudice the out-of-staters.1 5 So an
anti-Klaxon rule would be consistent with the supposed office of
diversity.
Not all problems of innovation in a coordinate system involve
state-state choice of law questions. Lower federal courts and state
113. The "dormant" commerce clause is one of the chief limits. See L. TRME,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

AMERiCAN

319-412 (1978).

114. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (requiring that federal
district courts sitting in diversity apply the choice of law.rules of the state m which they
sit).
115. This point is sharply and justifiably made by Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the
Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 ICH. L. REv. 392 (1980).
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courts stand on a par as expositors of federal law, including the
Constitution. I have shown elsewhere, in detail, that the relation of
state courts to lower federal courts m habeas corpus situations facilitates a creative dialogue in the ongoing work of articulating constitutional norms to govern the criminal process.11 The fact of
diachronic jurisdictional redundancy means that each system must
attend closely to the articulations of the other. For each system
can withhold from the other an element necessary to full success.
If there is disagreement as to what the Constitution requires, federal courts may release prisoners and thus frustrate the specific objective of the state court. However, the state courts may persist in
their independent and contrary view of the norm and, thus, in future cases, frustrate the norm the federal court seeks to impose.
In all such transition cases, civil or criminal, it is important to
see the nature of the plight of the litigant. She appeals to "law"
against law. It may be an appeal to law which one of several alternative forums calls no law. But so long as such a forum is only one
of several, there is room, for awhile at least, for recognition of the
truly open, tentative, and transitional status of norms which do
not yet command common acquiescence among all relevant authoritative courts. Openness about such transitional norms might be
useful m many ways. It might lead, for example, to compromise
either upon
the underlying claim or upon a third "neutral"
7
forum.

11

THE

CHALLENGE TO COORDINATION RuLEs

If jurisdictional redundancy has affirmative functional characteristics in these three, related areas of interest, ideology, and innovation, what consequences will follow with respect to the specific
rules that govern coordination in a system of complex concurrency9 These rules are of three sorts, involving: (a) rules and principles governing invocation of the forum, including rules governing
in personam and subject matter competence, stays, abstention and
other discretionary declinations of jurisdiction, forum non con116. Cover & Alemikoff, supra note 35.

117. We do not often think of compromise as the judicial solution to conflict over norm
articulation. Other cultures use compromise more fully than do we. See Eisenberg, supra

note 17, at 640-46.
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ventens, and others; (b) rules and principles governing the law applied, involving largely choice of law and Erie; and (c) rules governing effects of determinations, such as res judicata, collateral
estoppel, effects of judgments, and double jeopardy. Nothing of
what I have written thus far provides a determinative answer to
any question about specific coordination rules. Rather, I have
presented a justification for the system as a whole with its characteristic need for coordination. Despite this lack of specific answers,
several general principles are suggested that do have practical
implications.
First, since the substantive battlefields upon which conflicts of
interest, ideology, and innovation are fought change over time, it is
not to be expected that effective coordination rules will be substance-neutral emenations of formal structure alone. 1 8 Rather, the
areas of relatively unrestrained redundancy will change with the
salient social conflicts. Thus, recourse to the federal forum in diversity was of utmost significance, in terms of both ideology and
innovation, with respect to large scale equity receiverships and municipal bond litigation in the last half of the nineteenth century
and with respect to labor in the 1920's and early 1930's. Access to
the redundant federal forum under sections 1983119 and 1343120 has
been of equivalent concern in the 1960's and 1970's. When diversity, rather than civil rights jurisdiction, captures the relevant ideological differences, it will be with respect to diversity that coordination principles are highly articulated. The intricacies of diversity
jurisdiction could occupy the scholars of the 1890's and 1920's with
much the same degree of refinement as is now lavished upon section 1983.
Second, the political pressure for open avenues of redundancy
comes about when effects are not random. Thus, to the extent that
the redundant forum simply provides an avenue for forum shopping with no systematic differences arising from interest, ideology,
or innovation, there will not be an identifiable and cohesive group
prejudiced by the presence or absence of the alternative forum.
118. An example is the rule that a state must give the judgment of a sister state the same
effect as it has m the state of rendition.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
120. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (Supp. II 1979).
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When the forum becomes an issue to an identifiable group, it is
because that group thinks that there is more than mere randomly
distributed error at stake. This means that the very fact that significant groups have conflicting systematic preferences for a forum
or type of forum as to some issue is a strong argument for relatively unrestrained redundancy.
CONCLUSION

This paper has been a plea for a nonsolution. For some time the
jurisdictional structure of "our federalism" has struck me as comprehensible only as a blueprint for conflict and confrontation, not
for cooperation and deference. It seems unfashionable to seek out a
messy and indeterminate end to conflicts which may be tied neatly
together by a single authoritative verdict. Unquestionably, my perverse perspective may be carried too far. I, ultimately, do not want
to deny that there is value in repose and order. But the inner logic
of "our federalism" seems to me to point more insistently to the
social value of institutions in conflict with one another. It is a daring system that permits the tensions and conflicts of the social order to be displayed in the very jurisdictional structure of its courts.
It is that view of federalism that we ought to embrace.

